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CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM—FOR WHOM?: 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
KELLYE Y. TESTY* 
A widespread academic view is that the public corporation represents the natural selection of 
the fittest organizational adaption to the economies of scale, difficulties of agency costs, and 
problems of technology. . . . [T]he natural selection analogues are incomplete. . . . [P]olitics 
created the fragmented Berle-Means corporation . . . every bit as much as did natural laws of 
economy and technology.  The Berle-Means corporation . . . is an adaptation, not a neces-
sity.1 
Every economic decision and institution must be judged in light of whether it protects or un-
dermines the dignity of the human person.2 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 2001, two corporate law scholars together boldly pronounced the “end of 
history” for corporate law.3  To their minds, the dominance of the shareholder-
centered, neoclassical economic model of corporate governance had so far eclipsed all 
other models that there was nothing more to be said on the subject.  While that claim 
may have been an easier one to make before September 11, 2001,4 it became increas-
ingly implausible with the now-notorious collapse in late 2001 of the Enron Corpora-
tion.  As 2002 followed with additional, alarming revelations of widespread corporate 
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 1. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 286-87 (1994). 
 2. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER 
ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY ix (1986). 
 3. Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 454 
(2001). 
 4. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud 
and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1580 (2002) (“The terrorists had launched a direct attack on the 
American system.  Their actions expressed not only disregard for human life, but also disdain for the founda-
tions of American government, law, and our capitalist methods of production, distribution, and exchange.”). 
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fraud and other malfeasance,5 ushering in passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate 
governance reform legislation,6 it became clear that a new chapter in the history of 
corporate law had indeed begun. 
But what will be the storyline in this new chapter?  This key juncture in corporate 
law and governance renders this conference’s exploration of progressive and conser-
vative versions of legal ordering a particularly timely one.  Though the death an-
nouncement for the history of corporate law is now revealed as premature, the an-
nouncer’s underlying premise—the hegemony of U.S.-style shareholder-centered 
corporate governance—was right on target. 
Beginning at least in the 1980s, the version of corporate law and governance pre-
vailing in the U.S. (as well as widely exported to other nations) was a radically privat-
ized one, treating the corporation as a contractual arrangement for maximizing short-
term share price in a laissez faire global marketplace.7  Though many robust and var-
ied social movements, many of which were bolstered by the 1999 WTO protests in 
Seattle,8 have been and are engaged in challenging this hegemony from many angles,9 
few have found their way into corporate law reform.  That is not to say, however, that 
there are no progressive legal critiques from which to draw.  For some time a diverse 
minority of corporate law scholars has been calling for increased attention to issues of 
corporate accountability to a wide variety of corporate stakeholders and to public in-
terest concerns.10  Although those entreaties have not met with direct success in legal 
 
 5. E.g., Editorial, The Corporate Scandals, Cleaning Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at A20; Alison 
Mitchell, Corporate Conduct: Congressional Memo; A New (Election Year) Vigilance on Corporations, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 11, 2002, at C1; Richard W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel, Jr, Corporate Conduct: The Over-
view; Fed Chief Blames Corporate Greed; House Revises Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at A1. 
 6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 7. E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
 8. For commentary on WTO protests, see, e.g., John Birmingham, Voices of Dissent Won’t Destroy Us—
They Can Only Make Us Stronger, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 18, 2002, at 15; Hugh Dellios, Anti-WTO 
Protests Erupt; Thousands March on Mexico Meeting over Global Trade, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, September 11, 
2003, at 3; Clare Garner, WTO Protest: Who are the Protesters?, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec 2, 1999, at 
5; Andrew Gumbel, WTO Protest: The Apathy Generation Finally Has a Reason to be Angry, THE 
INDEPENDENT (London), December 2, 1999, at 5; Dave McIntyre, Officials Spin Seattle Protests for Political 
Advantage, DEUTSCHE-PRESSE-AGENTUR, December 2, 1999; Kim Murphy, Campaign 2000; Protesters are 
Wide Awake in Seattle—And Headed for L.A.; The Environmental Activists who Inspired Street Marches Dur-
ing Last Year’s World Trade Organization Talks are Gearing Up for the Democratic Convention, L.A. TIMES, 
August 6, 2000, at A3; Jim Redden, WTO Protests Seek Justice for All, CANBERRA TIMES, Dec 4, 1999, at C5; 
Ravina Shamdasani, Activists Stage Third WTO Protest in a Week; Global Network Wants Meetings with Dele-
gates to Mexico, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST LTD. (Hong Kong) September 15, 2003, at 3; Editorial, Trade 
protests, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST LTD. (Hong Kong) Dec. 2, 1999, at 20; WTO Protest Turns Ugly; 
Montreal Cops Make 100 Arrests, TORONTO STAR, July 29, 2003, at 17 . 
 9. E.g., DEFYING CORPORATIONS, DEFINING DEMOCRACY: A BOOK OF HISTORY AND STRATEGY (Dean 
Ritz ed., 2001); THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM, MARKET POPULISM, 
AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (2000); DAVID C. KORTEN, THE POST-CORPORATE WORLD (1999) 
[hereinafter, KORTEN, POST-CORPORATE WORLD]; DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE 
WORLD (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE]; DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATE 
POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY (2001). 
 10. E.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, 
CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT (2002); Kent Greenfield, September 11 and the 
End of History for Corporate Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1409 (2002); Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Econom-
ics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); 
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arenas, the voices have been increasing in both numbers and in theoretical sophistica-
tion.11  A key question, then, for this new chapter in corporate law is whether the con-
fluence of the mounting extra-legal critiques, the emerging progressive approach to 
corporate law, and the Enron-led rupture of confidence in corporate stewardship will 
ripen into meaningful reform or lapse into “business as usual.” 
To explore this urgent question, this essay proceeds in three parts.  It first provides 
an overview of the dominant conception of corporate law and the emerging progres-
sive assessments of that narrative.  It then offers the lens of feminist legal theory as a 
tool to further analyze corporate law, detailing the central components of feminist 
analysis and surveying the few feminist inroads made thus far into corporate law and 
governance.  The essay’s final section argues that a progressive theory of corporate 
law must also be a feminist theory, urges a more explicit alliance between the progres-
sive and feminist corporate law projects, and describes several additional substantive 
directions that a feminist, progressive view of corporate law should take. 
Not only is the unification of progressive and feminist theories important for gains 
in the political might that will be required to move the progressive project out of the 
law reviews and into the law, but it is important for a more substantive reason as well.  
Thus far, the progressive corporate law project’s most glaring omission is its failure to 
articulate normative values against which corporate law and policy might be judged, 
and thus to offer a positive prescription in addition to its critical assessments.  Femi-
nist theory fills that gap, helping to describe what corporate law should become, and 
thus strengthens the progressive project precisely at its weakest link. 
II 
COMPETING VIEWS OF CORPORATE LAW 
A nascent progressive critique of the dominant corporate law paradigm is begin-
ning to emerge in the United States and Canada to challenge the shareholder centered 
model that holds sway domestically and that is being widely exported to emerging na-
tions.12  In the realm of corporate law, unlike perhaps other systems of legal ordering, 
a progressive vision is at an embryonic stage.  Thus far, the progressive version of 
corporate law consists more of critique than it does positive prescription.  In order to 
examine that critique and its potential for substantive reform, this section begins with 
an outline of the key pillars of the dominant model. 
 
Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corpo-
rate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001); Kellye Y. Testy, Linking 
Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227 (2002). 
 11. See infra notes 28-47 and accompanying text. 
 12. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Globalization of Corporate and Securities Law in the Twenty-
First Century: Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45 (2002); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance 
and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999) (identifying the constraints on convergence in corporate 
governance); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate and Securities Law: An Introduction to a 
Symposium, and an Essay on the Need for a Little Humility When Exporting One’s Corporate Law, 16 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 1 (Fall 2002); Mary O’Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153 (July 2000); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance, Culture and Con-
vergence: Corporations American Style or With a European Touch?, 9 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 33 (2003). 
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A. The Dominant Model 
The dominant model of corporate law in the United States stems from its underly-
ing conception of the nature of the firm.  Known as contractarianism, the firm is 
viewed as a nexus of contracts rather than as an entity.13  That is, it is viewed as an ag-
gregate of various inputs acting together to produce goods and services.14  The “firm” 
is a legal fiction representing the set of implicit and explicit contractual relationships 
between and among participants, including employees, shareholders, creditors, and 
managers.15  Although the label might suggest otherwise, “contract” is not used in its 
traditional meaning.  Rather, it refers to any system that creates, modifies, or transfers 
assets.16 
Under this view of the firm, state corporate law is relegated to enabling the ex-
plicit and implicit bargains that comprise the firm.17  Serving as an off-the-rack stan-
dard form contract, it allows participants efficiency gains as they need only vary those 
provisions that do not suit them.18  Law is thus not mandatory, as it might be com-
monly assumed, but is instead a series of default rules that can be either accepted or 
bargained around as suits the participants in the firm. 
At least since Berle and Means’s classic exposition in the 1930s,19 to the extent 
that corporate law has a substantive thrust, it is aimed at solving agency problems.20  
Created by the separation of ownership (shareholders) from control (managers and di-
rectors) in the public corporation, agency issues include managers who might run the 
corporation incompetently or in their self-interest rather than in the shareholders’ best 
interests.  Moreover, agency issues also concern the free rider and other collective-
action impediments to widely dispersed shareholders’ abilities to hold management’s 
feet to the fire on their own.21  Accordingly, in order to address these agency issues, 
corporate law’s role is to assure that the corporation is indeed run in the interests of its 
 
 13. E.g., William Bratton, The ‘Nexus of Contracts’ Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. 
REV. 407, 410 (1989); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (firm is a “nexus for a set of contract-
ing relationships among individuals”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989) (advocating the “nexus of contracts” theory of the firm). But see Jean Braucher, 
Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990) 
(suggesting that the use of the term “contract” to explain relationships within firms is metaphorical and trouble-
some); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook 
and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989) (arguing that the “nexus of contracts” approach suffers from am-
biguity that limits its usefulness). 
 14. E.g., Bratton, supra note 13 at 420; Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 1451. 
 15. Bratton, supra note 13, at 420. 
 16. Id. at 417-18. 
 17. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7 (discussing enabling view of corporate law); 
see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 1451-53. 
 18. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17. 
 19. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(3d ed. 1991). 
 20. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW §§ 4.1-4.2, at 141-54 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining 
that the agency problem that confronts corporate officers and directors stems from their fiduciary duties to the 
corporation and the shareholders); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 305 (providing a seminal analysis of 
agency costs and the theory of the firm). 
 21. CLARK, supra note 20. 
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shareholders, leading to what many commentators refer to as the shareholder primacy 
norm in corporate law.22 
Shareholder primacy vests the shareholders, however, with ultimate monitoring 
authority. Thus, the directors are charged first and foremost with protecting the share-
holders’ interests.  As the firm’s residual claimant, the shareholder is thus encouraged 
to detect and punish shirking by the other constituents in order to enhance the residual 
claim.  Thus, shareholder wealth maximization becomes the board of directors’ pole-
star.23 
The board of directors is charged with managing the corporate enterprise.  All 
powers and duties reside in the Board as a whole.24  Because it is charged with manag-
ing the enterprise, and because it is elected by shareholders, the Board is said to owe 
fiduciary duties to the shareholders, who “own” the corporation and elect the direc-
tors.  These duties are usually characterized as the twin duties of care and loyalty, in 
addition to the obligation of good faith.25 
The duty of care can be likened to the duty to not be negligent in managing the 
corporation.  Although formally described as the requirement that the director must 
employ that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would employ in similar 
circumstances, the dominant version of corporate law has rendered the duty of care a 
largely procedural construct rather than one with substantive bite.26  The duty of loy-
alty can be likened to the duty to not be “selfish,” including the duty to not divert cor-
porate opportunities for personal benefit or to engage in transactions where the direc-
tor has a conflict of interest.  The reach of both duties, but particularly the duty of 
care, is significantly lessened in practice, in which directors enjoy substantial protec-
tions from liability for breach of duty, including the business judgment rule, indemni-
fication and insurance, exculpatory provisions in the articles of incorporation, good 
faith reliance on expert advice, and insurance contracts.27 
B. Progressive Corporate Law 
Like many discourses, particularly emergent ones, progressive corporate law is not 
amenable to easy definition.  At this juncture, however, it is fair to say that what ar-
guably unites progressive corporate law scholars is the concern they share over con-
centration and anti-democratic uses of corporate power, both domestically and glob-
ally.  More specifically, these scholars are motivated by deep concerns over corporate 
illegality and immorality;28 increasing wealth disparities that undermine economic 
democracy both domestically and globally;29 concentrations of corporate power and 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. E.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act, § 8 (1984). 
 25. E.g., id. 
 26. E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 27. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8 (1984). 
 28. E.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, Socio-Economics and Corporate Law Symposium: 
The New Corporate Social Responsibility: If I Only Had a Heart: or, How Can We Identify a Corporate Moral-
ity, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (2002). 
 29. Testy, supra note 10, at 1244. 
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corporate influence in political processes that undermine political democracy;30 and 
environmental degradation and other externalities visited upon workers, consumers, 
and communities.31 
Rather than focus exclusively on potential solutions to these issues that lie outside 
of what is traditionally characterized as “corporate” law, as earlier corporate social re-
sponsibility advocates primarily did,32 progressive corporate law scholars view the 
dominant model of corporate law itself as a large part of the problem.33  Accordingly, 
the work of progressive corporate law scholars has thus far zeroed in on some of the 
fundamental tenets of corporate law, especially ones on which the dominant, share-
holder-centered conception of corporate law rests.34 
Specifically, in contrast to the contractarian view of the firm, many progressive 
corporate law scholars view the corporation as an (at least) quasi-public entity.35  
Given its public dimensions, these scholars suggest that, like other public institutions, 
the corporation should be operated and regulated in accordance with the public inter-
est.  In this view, the corporation is somewhat more than the sum of its parts, and in-
dividuals acting within the corporate structure cannot be assumed to act as individuals 
do outside such a structure.36  Moreover, law has a much more substantive job to do.  
Rather than enable private bargaining, law constrains and compels the corporation to 
serve the public interest, not simply the shareholders’ interests. 
Thus, progressive corporate law scholars resist the hegemony of shareholder pri-
macy.37  In its place, they posit a web of stakeholders, each of which has an interest in 
the affairs of the corporation, and each of whom should be considered in managerial 
decisionmaking.38  In addition to shareholders, stakeholders variously include work-
ers, creditors, the community, and society as a whole.39  For progressive corporate law 
scholars, norms of long-term enterprise wealth-maximization and fair divisions of 
corporate rents predominate over short-term, shareholder wealth-maximization 
goals.40  Thus, rather than be beholden to one constituent, corporate boards and man-
agers are seen more as trustees for the entity and for the society in which that entity is 
situated. 
Progressive corporate law scholars have not yet reached consensus on issues con-
cerning the role, duties, and composition of the board of directors, though significant 
energy has been directed toward its appraisal.41  Some issues presently under explora-
 
 30. Id. at 1238-47. 
 31. See MITCHELL, supra note 10. 
 32. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1212-16 
(2002). 
 33. Id. at 1217-25. 
 34. See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10. 
 35. See MITCHELL, supra note 10. 
 36. Id. 
 37. E.g., Testy, supra note 10, at 1230-40. 
 38. Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 823 (Fall 2003). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., sources cited in note 10, supra. 
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tion include: (a) whether the board is more properly seen as a “mediating hierarch” 
under a Team Production Model of the firm;42 (b) whether “outside” directors enhance 
corporate decisionmaking, and what it means to be an “outside” director;43 and (c) 
what the proper contours of the duties of care and loyalty should be in order to con-
strain managerial self-interest without overly deterring entrepreneurship and beneficial 
risk taking.44 
Though the contours of the progressive corporate law critique are still emerging, it 
is also important at this juncture to make clear what progressive corporate law is not.  
Though often mistakenly categorized as such, progressive corporate law is not a rejec-
tion of market economies.  Instead, properly regulated markets are viewed by most 
progressive corporate law scholars as a superior means of resource allocation than are 
bureaucratic governments of nation-states.45  Thus, progressive corporate law is not 
anti-market.  Similarly, neither is it anti-corporate, though again it is often misjudged 
as such, particularly by those who, for political gain, would reject out of hand any cri-
tique of the corporation as inherently “anti-capitalist,” even un-American.46  Progres-
sive corporate law scholars recognize positive benefits of the corporate form, being far 
more concerned with dangers perceived in large-scale corporations—particularly 
multi-nationals—than in smaller, more closely held entities.47  It is thus not the corpo-
rate form per se that concerns progressive corporate law scholars; rather, it is particu-
lar incantations of that form and its effects upon the firm’s many constituents. 
III 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
A. Feminist Legal Theory: A Brief Overview 
Feminist legal theory is a rich and diverse approach to law and society, containing 
many different voices and strands of analysis.  Those various theories frequently have 
been delineated, compared, and contrasted elsewhere;48 that task will not be repeated 
 
 42. The Team Production Model was developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout.  See Margaret M. Blair 
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).  That model is 
garnering increasing attention from Progressive Corporate Law scholars. See, e.g., Testy, supra note 10, at 
1232-35; see also discussion infra notes 105-110 (explaining the Team Production Model). 
 43. R. William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a Culture of Greater 
Board Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV. 829 (Winter 2003); NYSE Board of Directors Ap-
proves New Corporate Governance and Disclosure Standards, 9 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 63 (Winter 2003); Pre-
liminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 54 MERCER L. REV. 
789 (Winter 2003). 
 44. E.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Adding Value(s) to Corporate Law: An Agenda for Reform, 34 GA L. REV. 1025 
(2000), at 1039-42; Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty 
of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389 (2002). 
 45. PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10; Branson, supra note 32. 
 46. PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, E.g., VISIBLE WOMEN: ESSAYS ON FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Susan James & Stephanie Palmer 
eds., 2002); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19, 20-29 (1991); Gary Lawson, 
Feminist Legal Theories, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325 (1995); Lanae Holbrook, Justice Barkett’s Feminist 
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here for that and other more substantive reasons.  Central among them is that in many 
instances the demarcations are not clear ones, nor are they the only ones possible to 
identify.  Further, many writers move quite fluidly between several of the various 
theoretical strands.  Though many of these strands of feminist theory developed at dif-
ferent times, and indeed on some occasions in opposition to one another, feminist le-
gal theory is best appreciated as encompassing all of these contributions.  Eschewing 
as it does any claim to a unitary or totalizing theory, feminist legal theory celebrates 
its many strands and is a richer theoretical approach to law for the multiple perspec-
tives it brings to diverse issues. 
As it has evolved, what unifies feminist legal thought is that it centers on an analy-
sis of the use and distribution power, seeking to articulate both a normative vision of 
equality and human flourishing for society as well as a critique of structures of subor-
dination, particularly for women, that impede those values.49  One of the goals of a 
feminist approach to law is the elimination of gender-based classifications in order to 
promote both formal and substantive equality.50  Another primary aim is to understand 
and value women’s differences, whether biologically or culturally based, and to insist 
that those differences be accepted by law and society rather than used to discount 
women.51  Stemming from psychologist Carol Gilligan’s work on moral reasoning,52 
feminists have deployed an “ethic of care” to re-envision law so that it takes account 
 
Jurisprudence, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161 (1992); Anne-Marie Leath Storey, An Analysis of the Doctrines and 
Goals of Feminist Legal Theory and Their Constitutional Implications, 19 VT. L. REV. 137 (1994). 
 49. See, e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLETT ET AL, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 
(3d ed. 2002); KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, CRITICAL RACE THEORY (1995); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, & 
CLASS (1983); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne 
Kennedy eds., 1991); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, FEMINISM & LEGAL THEORY (1996); CAROL GILLIGAN, 
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1993); CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); CATHERINE T. MACKINNON, 
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1991); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL, WORDS THAT WOUND: 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); PROPERTY: LAND 
OWNERSHIP AND USE (Joan Williams ed., 4th ed., 1997); ROBIN L. WEST, JURISPRUDENCE AND GENDER 
(1993); ROBIN L. WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW  (1993); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: 
WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2002); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the 
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 
(1991); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331-87 (1988); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational 
Myths: Independence, Autonomy, & Self Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 (2000); Martha 
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of a Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, in 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Wiesberg ed.,1993); Joan Williams, Toward A Reconstruc-
tive Feminism: Reconstructing The Relationship Of Market Work And Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89 
(1998). 
 50. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 1-3 (1999). 
 51. AN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMINIST AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Mary Jeanne Larrabee ed., 
1993); GILLIGAN, supra note 49; VIRGINIA HELD, FEMINIST MORALITY: TRANSFORMING CULTURE, SOCIETY, 
AND POLITICS (1993); SELMA SEVENHUIJSEN, CITIZENSHIP AND THE ETHICS OF CARE: FEMINIST 
CONSIDERATIONS ON JUSTICE, MORALITY AND POLITICS (Liz Savage, trans., 1998); JUSTICE AND CARE: 
ESSENTIAL READINGS IN FEMINIST ETHICS (Virginia Held ed., 1995); THE SUBJECT OF CARE: FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON DEPENDENCY  (Eva Feder Kittay & Ellen K. Feder eds., 2003); JOAN C. TRONTO, MORAL 
BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE (1993). 
 52. GILLIGAN, supra note 49. 
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of women’s ways of knowing and being, privileging the values of care and connec-
tion.53 
Furthermore, as feminist legal theory has progressed, it has increasingly focused 
on power relationships, group-based oppression, and systemic subordination.54  Draw-
ing on post-modernism,55 feminist legal theory uses an “anti-essentialist” critique to 
reject concepts of fixed women’s identities, recognizing in this way the differences 
among and between women, including race, sexuality, and class.56  Because one of its 
core methodologies is consciousness raising,57 feminist legal theory encourages many 
voices, even divergent ones. 
Feminist legal theory has played a vital role in improving the lives of women, as 
well as in enhancing societal flourishing more generally.58  Many examples abound, 
including increased opportunities in education, employment, sports, politics, and other 
realms of public and private life; increased condemnation of and restrictions on sexual 
harassment in education and employment and on domestic violence in intimate rela-
tionships; and increased freedom surrounding the sexual and reproductive aspects of 
life.59 
B. Feminist Inroads into Corporate Law: A Brief History 
Despite its successes in many areas, feminist legal theory has had little direct rela-
tionship to another area of increasing influence on all of our lives: the modern (and in-
 
 53. CHAMALLAS, supra note 50, at 62-70. 
 54. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (2d ed. 2000); Paulette M. 
Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365; Crenshaw, 
Mapping the Margins, supra note 50, at 1267-69; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the In-
tersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 
(1994); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 
461 (1993) (including intersectionality works); Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms 
of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251 (2002); Berta Esperanza Hernández 
Truyol, Building Bridges—Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1991); Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Disman-
tle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16 (1995); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis:” Intersec-
tionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 285 (2001); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, 
Critical Race Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet 
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 
640 (1997); Peter Kwan, Complicity and Complexity: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 687 
(2000); Peter Kwan, Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, Class, Gender & Sexual Orientation: Jeffrey Dahmer and 
the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1264 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer 
Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities & Inter-connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 25, 57-
66 (1995); Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to 
Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV. 
771 (1996); Adrien Katherine Wing, Violence and State Accountability: Critical Race Feminism, 1 GEO. J. 
GENDER & LAW 95 (1999). 
 55. E.g., THOMAS DOCHERTY, POSTMODERNISM (1992); FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson 
ed. 1990). 
 56. See FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER (Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle S. Ja-
cobs eds., 2003); CHAMALLAS, supra note 50, at 86-94. 
 57. See id., at 13, 135. 
 58. E.g., BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 49. 
 59. Id. 
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creasingly global) corporation.  To appreciate the present state of the feminist critique 
of corporate law and governance, a brief survey of the modern historical progression 
of feminist legal thought relating to corporate law is helpful.   
In the 1970s, a wave of “socialist feminism” attempted to combine a critique of 
production with a critique of reproduction and to make clear that patriarchy and capi-
talism were interlocking and mutually reinforcing power systems.60  Like other social-
ist critiques, this one failed to hold sway.  Today, labeling oneself as a “socialist” any-
thing, much less a “socialist feminist,” is more likely to draw laughter than anything 
else.61  Moreover, the trust in government that once led to a trust in non-market sys-
tems has certainly waned, and in response an interest in exploring improvements in 
market systems has ascended to displace other models.62 
Outside of the socialist critique of capitalism, one of the earliest efforts to apply 
feminist theory to corporate law came in 1985.63  Kathleen Lahey and Sarah Salter’s 
creative start in applying feminist insights to the corporation surveyed liberal, socialist 
and radical feminism in concluding that it was the latter perspective that promised the 
most powerful critique of corporate law—though it was both aided and foreshadowed 
by the earlier liberal and socialist literature.64  In their now almost twenty-year-old 
work, the materials that Lahey and Salter had to draw upon were sparse.  Lahey and 
Salter turned to the only literature they could find on women and the corporation, first 
drawing upon “corporate survival manuals” for women that were prompted by the 
feminist formal equality gains that opened the doors of corporate workspaces to 
women.65  Notably, they also relied upon the early work of Rosabeth Moss Kanter, 
which drew on both feminist principles of empowerment as well as on models of uto-
pian communities to critique the fragmenting effects of hierarchical organizational 
forms.66  Today, Ms. Kanter is a chaired professor in the Harvard Business School, 
and a successful consultant to and director of many corporations.67 
Not coincidentally, what is most striking about the twenty years that have elapsed 
since Lahey and Salter’s article is how sparse the literature still remains.  This may 
come as a surprise to many, but not likely to Lahey and Salter.  In closing they urged 
that “it is now time for feminist lawyers to begin to tell how the processes and ethics 
of corporate law contribute directly and indirectly to the domination of women.”68  
 
 60. E.g., CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM (Zillah R. Eisenstein ed., 
1979). 
 61. Robert Heilbroner, The Triumph of Capitalism, THE NEW YORKER, January 23, 1989, at 98. 
 62. E.g., KORTEN, POST-CORPORATE WORLD, supra note 9; KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE, supra 
note 9. 
 63. Kathleen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From 
Classicism to Feminism, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 543 (1985). 
 64. Id. at 544. 
 65. See id. at 546-47 & nn. 8-9. 
 66. Id. at 547-49. 
 67. See Professor Kanter’s biography, current research, and publications at Harvard Business School’s 
website at http://dor.hbs.edu/fi_redirect.jhtml?facInfo=bio&facEmId=rkanter (last visited January 15, 2004).  
See also ROSABETH M. KANTER THE CHANGE MASTERS: INNOVATION FOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE AMERICAN 
CORPORATION (1983); ROSABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1993); ROSABETH 
M. KANTER The Good Corporation and How to Get It, 96 BUS. & SOC. REV. 7 (1996). 
 68. Lahey & Salter, supra note 63, at 572. 
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However, they also cautioned that the “prospects for writing that will show different 
scholarly perspectives and challenge the dominant, implicit perspective depend upon 
the existence (and publication) of scholars who belong to groups that have been so so-
cially marginalized that they have not fully internalized the terms of the discourse of 
bureaucratic capitalism.”69  As the authors no doubt would have predicted, there are 
still few published professors at Harvard Business School (or other elite law or busi-
ness schools for that matter) who can fill those sensible shoes. 
Substantively, Lahey and Salter’s early analysis critiques corporate hierarchy and 
corporate ethics more than it critiques law per se.  Describing corporate structure as 
“masculist,”70 they fault it for disempowering individuals by separating them from one 
another through hierarchy and specialization, and from themselves through required 
separations between elements of personal and professional life.71  The co-authors also 
urge that not only is the structure of the corporation problematic, but so is the ethics, 
needing enhanced attention to the values of care and connection to replace the values 
of separation and abstraction.72 
To put it mildly, Lahey and Salter’s provocative article did not set off a wave of 
legal change or even a wave of other feminists taking up the research charge the co-
authors had urged.  It was not until 1992—seven years after the Lahey and Salter arti-
cle—that an American corporate law scholar ventured directly into the discourse of 
feminism and corporate law.  Theresa Gabaldon’s The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and 
Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders,73 was the first 
article to do so.  To be sure, many feminists had written on topics critical of market 
ideology and related to business and corporate law, including Catherine MacKinnon’s 
ground-breaking work on the sexual harassment of working women.74  But until 
Gabaldon, no feminist scholar had addressed corporate law or one of its central tenets 
directly. 
Gabaldon’s article discusses the concept of limited liability75 as well as many 
feminist theoretical approaches76 at some length, though in the end it does not recom-
mend repeal of limited liability for corporate shareholders.  Deferring to concerns over 
“capital flight” unless there was world-wide adoption of unlimited liability,77 as well 
 
 69. Id. at 569 (discussing Wendy Brown, Challenging Bureaucracy, 2 WOMEN’S REVIEW OF BOOKS 16 
(1984) (book review). 
 70. Id. at 543. 
 71. Id. at 553-57. 
 72. Id. at 570. 
 73. Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of 
Corporate Shareholders 46 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1992). 
 74. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); CATHERINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST 
THEORY].  For other early works on subjects closely related to the activities of corporations and the effects of 
markets on women’s lives, see, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1497; Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989). 
 75. Gabaldon, supra note 73, at 1394-1413. 
 76. Id. at 1413-24. 
 77. Id. at 1447. 
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as practical concerns with implementation,78 Gabaldon instead argues for shareholder 
empowerment and enhanced insurance requirements for business enterprises.79 
Though Gabaldon did not ultimately recommend a change in limited liability 
based upon feminist insights, her article established that corporate law’s major struc-
tures might look very different through a feminist lens and that the questions asked by 
feminism were ones worth asking in the context of corporate law. 
C. Feminist Legal Theory and Corporate Law Today 
Since Gabaldon’s Lemonade Stand article, assessments of corporate law that are 
either self-labeled as feminist, or that can reasonably be construed as such, have begun 
to gather steam.  Over the past five years, a nascent conversation applying feminist in-
sights to corporate and business law has emerged in the legal academy, and momen-
tum seems to be gaining. Gabaldon has continued to make forays into this field,80 as 
have a handful of other scholars, including Ronnie Cohen,81 Janis Sarra,82 Cheryl 
Wade,83 Faith Kahn,84 Marleen O’Connor,85 and this writer.86 
These scholars’ feminist insights into corporate law divide into three key points.  
The first is a challenge to shareholder primacy and an argument that corporate deci-
sionmaking should consider a wider array of constituents without the hierarchy of the 
shareholder primacy model.87  The second is a critique of the shortcomings of existing 
fiduciary duty law, and an argument that feminist insights into concepts of care and 
connection can and should give increased substantive content to director and officer 
duties.88  The third argument is more wide ranging but through different tacks is at its 
core a critique of concentrations of undemocratic corporate power together with an ar-
gument that to the extent that power works hardships on individuals in society, those 
hardships fall disproportionately on women (especially third-world women).89 
These critiques bear a remarkable similarity to the progressive critique of corpo-
rate law.  The feminist project has the potential to expand the extant progressive cri-
 
 78. Id. at 1448. 
 79. Id. at 1448-54. 
 80. Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Assumptions About Relationships Reflected in the Federal Securities Laws, 
17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 215 (2002); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White Man’s Burden, 
70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 944 (2002) [hereinafter Gabaldon White Man’s Burden]; Theresa A. Gabaldon, Femi-
nism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate and Securities Law, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1995). 
 81. Ronnie Cohen, Feminist Thought and Corporate Law: It’s Time to Find Our Way Up from the Bottom 
(Line), 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1994). 
 82. Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 457 
(Fall/Winter 2002). 
 83. Cheryl L. Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy on Women and People of Color, 7 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 213 (2003). 
 84. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and Power in Corpo-
rate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1107 (1997). 
 85. Marleen A. O’Connor, THE ENRON BOARD: THE PERILS OF GROUPTHINK, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 
(2003). 
 86. Testy, supra note 44. 
 87. E.g., Gabaldon, White Man’s Burden, supra note 80. 
 88. E.g., Testy, supra note 44, at 1039-42. 
 89. E.g., Cohen, supra note 81; Sarra, supra note 82; Testy, supra note 44. 
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tique, however, by articulating normative values that can and should give content to a 
new vision of corporate law and governance.  At its best, feminism has never been 
content with method for method’s sake, nor with betterment only for persons born bio-
logically female.90  Instead, at its best, feminism has been directed toward articulating 
a normative vision of the relationship between life and law, one that prescribes a 
moral vision for social ordering, based upon the principles of equality and human 
flourishing.91  As a result, the progressive corporate law project can cure its remarked-
upon92 failure to articulate an alternative substantive vision and criteria for evaluation 
by uniting with the emerging feminist vision of corporate law and governance. 
IV 
UNITING FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
As the progressive corporate law project moves forward, a first key step then, is a 
more explicit unification with the feminist corporate law scholars, making clear that a 
progressive vision of corporate law is a feminist vision.  Because both of these corpo-
rate law discourses are in embryonic stages, however, there is much more left to do to 
synthesize a feminist, progressive analysis of corporate law and governance.  More-
over, given the current state of intellectual and political disruption caused by the wide-
spread post-Enron disclosures of corporate wrongdoing, the time is ripe for progress 
to be made in this field. 
At present, disclosures of widespread corporate fraud and accounting irregularities 
have shaken confidence in markets and placed the financial security of many pension-
ers and retirees into question.93  Moreover, globalization continues to propel Ameri-
can-style corporate practices around the world, often into societies that lack many of 
the extra-corporate institutional safeguards that somewhat soften capitalism’s harsh 
side.94  More often than not, that harsh side falls disproportionately on women.95  And 
despite continued celebrations of capitalism’s global triumph, societal wealth dispari-
 
 90. CHAMALLAS, supra note 50, at 9-21; CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). 
 91. CHAMALLAS, supra note 50, at 9-21. 
 92. For the most recent critique on this basis see Mitu Gulati, What are Larry’s Criteria for Good Corpo-
rate Law?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 886 (2002). 
 93. Sherri Day, Enron’s Fallout Dampens Stock Prices, N.Y. Times, February 10, 2002 § 3, at 17. 
 94. See, e.g., The World Bank’s Transition Newsletter, at http://www.worldbank.org/transitionnewsletter 
(last visited January 15, 2004); The World Bank’s Policy Research Working Papers: Abstracts; Transition 
Economies website, at http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/tranecon.html (last visited 
January 15, 2004); The World Bank, Transition—The First Ten Years: Analysis and Lessons for Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union (2001), at http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ECA/eca.nsf/Attachments/ 
Transition1/$file/complete.pdf (last visited November 3, 2004). 
 95. Natacha David, Women and the Economy, Education International, at http://www.ei-
ie.org/pub/english/epbwo-eco.htm (last visited January 15, 2004); FWCW Platform for Action: Women and the 
Economy, The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, 1995, at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/economy.htm (last visited January 15, 2004); Peter F. 
Orazem and Milan Vodopivec, Male-Female Differences in Labor Market Outcomes during the Early Transi-
tion to Market: The Case of Estonia and Slovenia, The World Bank’s Policy Research Working Papers, at  
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2087/wps2087.pdf (last vis-
ited January 15, 2004). 
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ties and environmental degradation continue to deepen for most of the world’s popula-
tion.96  Thus, the time is ripe to consider more seriously whether feminist legal theory 
might bolster the progressive corporate law project by providing an enhanced norma-
tive and methodological framework for re-envisioning and restructuring the role and 
place of the modern corporation in society. 
To begin the project of connecting these two discourses, this section will suggest 
three categories of pursuit for the progressive corporate law project, all of which rely 
on key feminist values: nurturing connectedness, attending to context, and furthering 
equality and human flourishing. 
A. Connectedness 
Feminism is a discourse that privileges the value of connection.97  One area of in-
quiry that progressives need to take up immediately is whether further academic link-
ages, particularly interdisciplinary ones, can be made to advance the progressive pro-
ject of reform.  To some extent, this is already occurring: Martha Fineman, one of the 
most renowned feminist legal scholars,98 is foremost among academics inculcating 
cross-disciplinary inquiries.  Her Feminism and Legal Theory workshops seek to 
bridge prior divides between areas of legal inquiry—as well as between disciplines— 
and a significant amount of promising work is emerging from those workshops.99  For 
instance, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have recently linked law and economics and 
critical race theory—heretofore seen as oppositional discourses—in order to more 
deeply probe the complicated dynamics of workplace discrimination.100 
There are additional interdisciplinary connections to be made as well, many of 
which I have written about elsewhere,101 so only a few important ones are highlighted 
here.  As noted at the outset of this essay, a well-developed critique of corporations is 
emerging outside of law, stemming from concerns that corporate activity increases 
 
 96. Renu Khator, Ethical Implications of World Trad on the Environment of Developing Countries,  31 J. 
OF SOC. PHIL. 465 (2000) (presented at the AmFiTan Development Ethics Conference, Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanza-
nia, February 8-11, 2000); Environmental Focus Series: The Mexican Market, Final Report, Office of Energy, 
Environment, and Technology, U.S. Agency for International Development, at 
http://www.weea.org/USAID%20Reports/Documents/Mexican%20Market.pdf (last visited October 27, 2004); 
The Project on Human Development, Boston University, at http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/dev_indicators/ 
view.cfm?header_id=21#Age/Gender_87 (last visited January 15, 2004).  
 97. CHAMALLAS, supra note 50, at 62-67. 
 98. See, e.g., AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha Albertson Fineman 
& Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991); FEMINISM, MEDIA AND THE LAW (Martha Albertson Fineman & 
Marhta T. McClusky eds., 1997); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY (2004); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & TERENCE DAUGHERTY,  FEMINISM CONFRONTS 
HOMO ECONOMICUS (ECONOMIC MAN) (forthcoming 2005); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION 
OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, 
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); 
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (1994); 
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINISM AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD (Martha Albertson Fineman & 
Isabel Karpin eds., 1995). 
 99. See generally Emory School of Law Feminism and Legal Theory Workship, at 
http://www.law.emory.edu/flt/ (last visited January 12, 2004). 
 100. Devon Carbado & Mike Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 
(2003) (book review). 
 101. See Testy, supra note 10. 
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concentrations of wealth, undermines democracy, and relegates much of the world’s 
population to increasing states of deprivation.102  The progressive corporate law pro-
ject needs a deeper and more explicit connection with this extra-legal field.  Further, 
in the field of economics, critiques of the dominant neo-classical model are maturing, 
and include feminist103 and socio-economic104 analyses that promise substantial contri-
butions to the progressive corporate law project.  Even within the field of law itself, 
linkages are under-explored.  The progressive corporate law project should connect to 
progressive work in the fields of labor, environmental, pension and benefits, tax, 
banking, international law, and human rights within law, as well as working across 
disciplinary boundaries. 
The difficult issues raised by the current configurations of corporate power, both 
domestically and globally, are interdisciplinary ones.  Accordingly, they will demand 
interdisciplinary solutions.  Because progressive corporate law scholars understand 
economic and business institutions, they are particularly well suited to be of aid in this 
cross-disciplinary analysis of globalization and concentrations of corporate power.  
Many critiques of corporate power have traditionally come from fields with little ex-
perience in or connection to the worlds of business, finance and economics.  The 
complex global institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the WTO, and all of the complex global agreements that concern multi-national 
business activity must enter the discourse of progressive corporate law scholars.  
Those, too, are the connections that need to be explored as this project continues to 
mature and become increasingly effective. 
B. Context 
Feminism also values attention to context, eschewing abstract rules and disembod-
ied analyses.  Thus, in addition to attention to connection, the progressive corporate 
law project would be furthered by enhanced attention to context.  Attention to context 
can provide important critical insights for the progressive corporate law project, as 
well as provide a platform for the next stage of articulating a normative vision of cor-
porate law from that critique.  Here, opportunities abound for fruitful inquiry and 
evaluation.  In brief outline, those include inquiring into matters such as the nature of 
the firm, types of corporations and demographics of their constituents, and the nature 
of markets and forms of capitalism. 
1. Nature of the Firm 
In an effort to address concerns over shareholder primacy, Professors Margaret 
Blair and Lynn Stout recently have developed an alternative model of corporate law 
 
 102. See, e.g., ALTERNATIVES TO ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION (2002); CHARLES DERBER, CORPORATION 
NATION (1998); RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE (1996); ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE 
TROUGH (2003); MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL (2001); KORTEN, POST-CORPORATE 
WORLD, supra note 9; KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE, supra note 9. 
 103. See generally FEMINIST ECONOMICS TODAY: BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie 
A. Nelson eds., 2003). 
 104. See LYNNE DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC APPROACH (forthcoming 2004). 
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and theory that they label the Team Production Model (TPM).105  Attention to context 
can provide an important progressive critique of this alternative model.  Before turn-
ing to that critique, this section first provides a brief overview of the model’s attrib-
utes. 
As its name implies, TPM conceptualizes corporate participants—including man-
agers, shareholders, employees, creditors, and local communities—as a team.106  The 
team forms because the members perceive that each will obtain more from the coop-
erative endeavor than from individual action,107 leaving, however, the difficult ques-
tion of how the spoils of that team effort will be divided.  Blair and Stout solve that 
pie-division difficulty by vesting allocational authority in a third party, which they 
view as the board of directors of the corporation.108  Accordingly, rather than view di-
rectors as beholden to shareholders, TPM sees directors as beholden to the “team.”  
Blair and Stout present TPM as both a better description of current corporate govern-
ance and as a superior normative theory of what corporate governance should be once 
unyoked from slavish devotion to shareholder interests. 
Because the theory has been developed by two women (still more of a novelty in 
corporate law circles than should be the case), and because it is presently the only 
well-developed alternative to the shareholder primacy model of the corporation, there 
is a risk that it will be seen as a progressive model, which it is not.  As David Millon 
has written in a critique of TPM on both descriptive and normative grounds, allocation 
becomes “a matter of power rather than principle.”109  In a corporate governance 
model that allocates resources according to who can strike the best bargain with the 
board, it is clear that bargaining power will be determinative of outcome.  In any bar-
gaining context, it is the person with the power of exit who enjoys the upper hand.  
Because of liquid trading markets, the power to walk away from the bargaining table 
is a power shareholders, not workers or communities, enjoy in the public corporation.  
Shareholders again come out on top, which becomes shareholder primacy in practice 
if not in theory.  Thus, a contextual view of TPM reveals it to be one more way to re-
inscribe existing power relations rather than to disrupt them. 
Moreover, the model leaves in place the “nexus of contracts” view of the firm, a 
disembodied and abstract view that fails  again to exhibit the sensitivity to context that 
feminism privileges.  One of feminism’s key insights has been a discomfort with ab-
straction, which invites dominant constructs to define the norm.  For feminism, theory 
built without context is at best hollow and at worst dangerous, because the hollowness 
is likely to be filled by norms of privilege.  For example, when no race is specified, 
that silence codes as white; when no sex is specified, that silence codes as male.  
Thus, contractarianism’s hypothetical bargainer, with no race, no gender, no class, no 
 
 105. Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 265-76 (1999); see also Symposium, Team Production in Business 
Organizations, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999) (reprinting Blair and Stout’s article in the Virginia Law Review and 
including several responsive commentaries). 
 106. Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 250, 253. 
 107. See id. at 264-71. 
 108. Id. at 271. 
 109. David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual?  A Critique of the Team Production Model of 
Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 passim (2000). 
05_TESTY_FMT.DOC 2/16/2005  9:33 AM 
Autumn 2004] FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 103 
sexual orientation—in short no social location—fails to address the power disparities 
that flow from structural societal inequalities.  From a feminist view of corporate law, 
the social location, or context, of each bargainer is highly salient. 
2. Demographics 
A related line of context-based analysis into the corporation would be to pay more 
attention to the demographics of the various corporate constituents, including the 
shareholders, managers, other workers, consumers, and board members.  This atten-
tion to demographics might take a number of directions.  For instance, were a demo-
graphic analysis to reveal that shareholders as a group are disproportionately white, 
this would further complicate an emphasis on shareholder primacy as the leading 
model of corporate law because it would exacerbate racial inequality.  Conversely, 
shareholder primacy might be of lesser concern to progressive corporate law adherents 
if it were shown that shareholder demographics were such that an emphasis on share-
holder rights was tantamount to improving structural inequalities based on race and/or 
gender.  In short, progressive corporate law with a feminist lens needs to know “who 
is whom” before deciding on reforms that alter power arrangements. 
Similar demographic attention needs to be paid to the composition of corporate 
management and boards which by all accounts remain predominately white, male in-
stitutions.  Significantly more research and analysis needs to be conducted to deter-
mine the reasons for this state of inequality, as well as whether and how the social lo-
cation of the decisionmakers affects the substance of the decisions being made. 
As decisionmaking processes are probed, attention to context will also mean that it 
should be part of the progressive corporate law project to look within the corporation 
to probe decisionmaking at all levels of the enterprise.  Thus far, corporate law schol-
ars have focused primary attention on decisionmaking by the board.  But the board is 
not a day-to-day decisionmaking entity in the firm—the managers and other employ-
ees do far more of that.  Thus, contextual dynamics at those levels must also be inter-
rogated, particularly when results, such as workplace discrimination, are discordant 
with progressive values. 
3. Types of Corporations 
A third line of context-based analysis would require more attention to what is 
meant when the “corporation” is critiqued.  As noted earlier, it is not all corporations 
that progressive corporate law finds problematic; closely held corporations present 
very different issues than multi-nationals, for instance.  Thus, greater care should be 
taken to attend to context by being more exact in spelling out the kinds of corporate 
contexts that create problems for a progressive vision.  This line of analysis will not 
only enrich the project substantively, but it will also insulate it from some categorical 
dismissals as being entirely “anti-corporate.”  This latter point is an important one.  
One of the central contributions of the progressive corporate law project is its refusal 
to look only outside the corporation and corporate law for solutions to excesses of 
corporate power.  Thus, attention to the specific contexts in which corporate power is 
discordant with progressive values will assure that the more nuanced contributions of 
progressive corporate law will not be lost in arguments over “anti-corporate” rhetoric. 
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4. Separating Markets from Capitalism 
A related area of focus for the progressive project is the difference between mar-
kets and capitalism, and between different versions of markets and capitalism.  Too 
often, critiques of one are subsumed in the other, and the words are used as if they are 
monolithic and self-defining terms.  Outside of the legal context, David Korten has 
argued persuasively that though “the Siren known as capitalism wraps herself in the 
cloak of markets, democracy, and universal prosperity, she is the mortal enemy of all 
three.110  Moreover, another recent work by two financial economists, Luigi Zingales 
and Raghuram Rajan, takes issue with the present “anti-market” brand of capitalism 
prevailing at this time in the United States.111  These directions are promising ones for 
the progressive corporate law project, allowing it to be more clear about its normative 
commitments to markets and their democratizing potential.112 
As above, this, too, is an important point to assure that progressive corporate law 
is not misperceived.  Progressive corporate law scholars seek to optimize the social 
benefits from market forms of social organization rather than seek to eliminate reli-
ance on markets in wholesale favor of other systems.  Moreover, showing attention to 
context, progressive corporate scholars would do well to make more explicit that, de-
pending upon the society, the balance between reliance on markets and other systems 
(e.g., government) might vary.  A country with a well-developed and efficiently func-
tioning legal system, for instance, can afford more thorough reliance upon markets 
than a system in which opportunistic market participants are not properly constrained 
by law.  In sum, for the progressive corporate law scholar, systems of social organiza-
tion such as markets and government are not seen as stark choices, but as allies that 
work together in different calibrations depending on the context in which they are 
situated. 
C. Commitment to Equality and Human Flourishing 
Progressive corporate law is at a crossroads.  On the one hand, it has gained mo-
mentum in providing a critique of the dominant paradigm of corporate law, being par-
ticularly aided recently by widespread public distrust of corporate officials.  What 
progressive corporate law has not yet succeeded in doing, however, is gaining consen-
sus on a set of values against which reforms can be measured, though some inroads 
have been made in that effort.  Thus, moving from deconstruction to reconstruction of 
corporate law will require articulation of and a commitment to values and principles.  
Feminism provides those values—commitments to substantive equality and human 
flourishing.  The more difficult question is whether progressive corporate law scholars 
will commit to them. 
Though a strong ideology states otherwise, there is little evidence that the current 
state of capitalism is having a positive impact on most human beings on the planet.  
Indeed, there is much evidence to the contrary as wealth disparity deepens and indi-
 
 110. KORTEN, POST-CORPORATE WORLD, supra note 9, at 37-38. 
 111. RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS: 
UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS TO CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY (2003). 
 112. See generally KORTEN, POST-CORPORATE WORLD, supra note 9, at 37-63. 
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viduals, families, and communities are left in varying states of deprivation.113  True, 
those with resources are gaining more.  But those without are still without, in some 
cases more so than ever before.  Thus, a real commitment to equality and human 
flourishing would have to ask for far more change in corporate law and policy than 
has thus far been suggested.  No more can the project be content with leaving all 
structure in place and tinkering only with questions such as board composition, the na-
ture of the firm, and arguments for recognizing a broader corporate constituency.  In-
stead, reforms such as the following, briefly outlined here, would need to be consid-
ered. 
1. Public/Private Dichotomy 
The firm’s classic characterization as “private”—or as a site for private ordering—
cannot withstand a feminist analysis.  “If the most private also most affects society as 
a whole, the separation between public and private collapses as anything other than 
potent ideology.”114  The trope of the private in corporate law has functioned much 
like it has in family law: hiding a house of abuse.  Lurking behind it is not only main-
tenance of structural inequalities such as racism and sexism, but also, more broadly, 
the engines of wealth disparity.  A key project for progressive corporate law is to ex-
pose this misleading fiction of the private and to dismantle it. 
2. Limited Liability 
Limited liability is an odd concept in a feminist analysis.  The idea that one can 
escape personal responsibility for harms caused to others is as contrary to feminist 
norms as it is to most every other area of legal doctrine and theory.  This concept, 
which is granted by state power, must be further examined for its costs and benefits.  
At a minimum, it should be restored to its original use, protecting individual share-
holders—human beings.  Today, limited liability is more often used to protect a cor-
porate shareholder within a long chain of subsidiaries, most of which function as “di-
visions” more than as separate entities.  This triumph of form over substance offends 
feminist, progressive values and sanctions excessive risk taking because there is only 
the potential for upside gain in risky activities.115  The corporation can be insulated 
from liability; even its shareholders ultimately stand to profit if the risky venture suc-
ceeds. 
While strong policy reasons may support limited liability for individual sharehold-
ers, a very different context arises when the shareholder is another corporation that al-
ready enjoys limited liability itself.  Thus, rather than the present “one-size-fits-all” 
doctrines of alter ego and piercing the corporate veil, it is vital to tailor the law to ac-
count for these varying contexts.  Here, both legislative and judicial solutions are pos-
sible.  One possibility would be to revive prior law that prohibited one corporation 
from owning stock in another.  To the extent it is the scale and complexity of large 
 
 113. See, e.g., supra footnotes 95 to 97 and accompanying text. 
 114. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 74, at 192. 
 115. For a more sophisticated approach to liability in corporate groups, which prioritizes economic sub-
stance over mere form, see Philip Blumberg’s extensive and promising work on enterprise liability.  E.g., 
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS (2002). 
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corporate enterprises that creates a lack of accountability, this legal change has sub-
stantial potential to ameliorate that daunting concern.  Another possibility is statutory 
or judicial action to change the alter ego and “piercing the corporate veil” doctrines to 
permit more liberal access to the corporation and its assets.  Corporations are currently 
permitted it to hide behind a series of subsidiaries.  Indeed, currently many subsidiar-
ies have no assets to satisfy creditors, nor is a creditor even aware that he is dealing 
with anything other than the parent corporation—making practical details, such as ser-
vice of process, rather difficult. 
3. Board of Directors’ Duties and Composition 
Directors’ duties of care and loyalty must be redefined in state corporate law stat-
utes to carry more substantive clout and must not be subject to amelioration in corpo-
rate charters or other contractual arrangements.  It is stunning that words that hold so 
much promise have meant so little.  The dominant conception of directors’ duties 
looks rather much like the traditional conceptions of a father’s parenting role: sitting 
in an easy chair, feet up, martini in hand, and glad that no one is telling him that there 
is any trouble in the house.  Duties of care and loyalty need to move from a fatherly 
configuration to a motherly one.  Loyalty would mean more what Judge Cardozo 
(demonstrating that feminist values are not confined to biological females) thought it 
meant: “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”116  Care would mean more what 
the settlement decision in In Re Caremark Intermational Inc. Derivative Litigation117 
suggests: proactive, searching for trouble in order to prevent it or cure it rather than 
sitting back and hoping not to hear of any. 118 
The composition of the board of directors is one issue garnering significant atten-
tion in post-Enron discussions of corporate governance reform.  Progressive corporate 
law scholars should join that discourse, pushing for reforms that are more than simply 
cosmetic, especially with regard to the composition of the board.  For instance, boards 
should be primarily (not equally, or by simple majority) outside, independent direc-
tors.  Furthermore, definitions of independence should be rigorous ones, and no cre-
dence should be given to claims that there are not enough good outside directors to go 
around, a claim that is laughable given the vast amount of talent in this country cur-
rently un- or under-employed. 
4. Corporate Personhood 
Though a vigorous debate regarding corporate personhood is mounting outside of 
the legal academy, progressive corporate law scholars have skirted this issue.  The 
question whether a corporation should enjoy rights, such as due process and free 
speech, that a human is entitled to under our system of law is one that progressive 
corporate law scholars need to delve into in earnest.  Grappling with the historical de-
velopment of that concept will reveal the corporation more fully as the contingent so-
 
 116. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (“not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive, is then the standard of the marketplace”). 
 117. In re Caremark Int. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 118. Id. at 968. 
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cial institution it is, rather than a natural or inevitable entity.  The greater the under-
standing of the historical, social, and political contingency of the corporation, the 
greater the ability to see opportunities for change.  Because progressive corporate law 
scholars understand many of the intricacies of corporate law, it is important that they 
add their voices to debates about corporate personhood. 
5. Corporations and the Political Processes 
In the United States, government is supposed to be of the people, by the people, 
and for the people, not the corporation.  Again, a growing number of voices outside 
corporate law argue that corporations should be prohibited from participating in the 
political process, and progressive corporate law scholars should be part of that chorus.  
People should write laws that corporations obey, not vice versa.  Campaign contribu-
tions and lobbying expenditures, whether direct or indirect, should be illegal, not tax 
deductible.  Corporate officers and board members, while surely free to engage in the 
political process as individuals, should not be permitted to act in their corporate ca-
pacities in the political process, including fundraising.119 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Sustained commitment to feminist values will require courage in addition to con-
nections, context, and commitment.  Some of the questions will not be easy ones to 
ask; indeed, assuming success in reform, some of the changes may not be easy ones to 
accept.  For instance, were some of the changes suggested above implemented,  the 
normative commitments to equality might hit particularly close to home when their 
effects reach academia.  The ranks of progressive corporate law scholars, like other 
legal academics, are an elite group.  Power and privilege are not easily released, 
though some of that will be asked if the progressive project is to reach its transforma-
tive potential. 
Feminism is a rich theoretical and practical discipline on which to draw to further 
the progressive corporate law project.  One of feminism’s key insights has been that 
the “personal is political.”  For the individuals and communities who suffer from cor-
porate malfeasance—from the worker with no work, to the pensioner with no pension, 
to the ill with no health care, and to the village with no clean water—the harms are in-
deed both personal and political.  But their political nature is as much cause for cele-
bration as for despair.  Because they are political, they are also unnecessary and 
changeable. 
Progressive corporate law has the potential to realign corporate activity and mar-
ket economies with human (and thus societal) benefit.  The present state of disruption 
in our economy is a key moment: with disruption comes the opportunity for change.  
Markets, properly regulated, are unquestionably a more liberating form of social or-
ganization than state control.  And economic freedom is unquestionably a necessary 
precondition to any broader notion of freedom in this interconnected society of the 21st 
 
 119. See KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE, supra note 9, at 266-67. 
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Century.  Our progressive task is to make sure that our brand of capitalism leads to 
freedom—freedom not just for some, but for all. 
